American Savings & Loan Association v. C. John Gibson, Lewis E. Young, Bonneville Industries, Inc. : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
American Savings & Loan Association v. C. John
Gibson, Lewis E. Young, Bonneville Industries, Inc.
: Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ted Boyer; Anneli R. Smith; Clyde, Pratt & Snow; Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellee.
Gerald M. Conder; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, American Savings & Loan Association v. C. John Gibson, Lewis E. Young, Bonneville Industries, Inc., No. 900264.00 (Utah
Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3062
• fvn 
UMENT 
KFU Ui\>^h 
45.9 / 
.S9 OfOO Xio^i 
POCKET N O : - «> 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, a Federal 
Association 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
C. JOHN GIBSON, LEWIS E. 
YOUNG and BONNEVILLE 
INDUSTRIES, INC., a NEVADA 
corporation 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Supreme Court 
No. 900264 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge, 
Presiding. 
GERALD M. CONDER (07 08) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Appellant, Bonneville 
Industries, Inc. 
466 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
TED BOYER (0413) 
ANNELI R. SMITH (4507) 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellee 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84101 
i L, tz u 
MAY ? 0 1991 
CLERK SUPREME COURT. 
UTAH 
. > THE SUPREME COURT 
KV THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN SAVINGS -. 
ASSOCIATION, a - -• \ ,. 
Association 
Plaint i f f a. n d Ap p e 11 e e , 
vs . 
C. uUs;^ GIBSON, ,.^-WiI.;' 
YOUNG and BONNEVILLE 
INDUSTRIES, 'NT 
corooratior 
Dt., endant ;*r . -.^u ^  _ 
Supreme Court 
No. 9 00 26 4 
Annns^ fron. 
Presiding. 
; h i . r u J U L 
'
T E F 
. i ; i 3 t i i c i 
ie1-h F i a t r * : : 
.*. r "*_ JI 
Jud-^e , 
GERALE 1 i. CONDER (0 7 08) 
A11 orne y for Defendant 
Ap pellant, Bo nne vi11e 
Industries, Inc. 
466 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
TED BOYER (0 413) 
ANNELI R. SMITH (450 i ) 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellee 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South, Suite 200 
S a l t Lake C i t y , ! IT 8411 0] 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF PARTIES iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
a. Cases cited ii 
b. Rules ii 
c. Statutes ii 
d. Other Authorities . ii 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 2 
ARGUMENT 3 
POINT I AMERICANS CAUSE OF ACTION AS TO BONNEVILLE 
IS A DEFICIENCY ACTION BASED UPON THE 
GUARANTY DRAFTED BY AMERICAN 3 
POINT II AN ABSOLUTE GUARANTY REQUIRES COMMERCIAL 
REASONABLENESS IN THE DISPOSITION OF 
SECURED PROPERTY 5 
POINT III THE SUBSEQUENT REVOLVING LOAN TO C. JOHN 
GIBSON RESULTED IN A MATERIAL MODIFICATION 
AND A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE OF RISK TO 
BONNEVILLE 8 
POINT IV MATERIAL FACTS EXIST WHICH PREVENT THE 
GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
AMERICAN 10 
CONCLUSION 12 
A-l 
UCC-1 Dated November 1, 1983 A-2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
a. CASES CITED 
Carrier Brokers7 Inc. vs. Spanish Trail 
751 P. 2d 258 (Court Of Appeals for Utah 
1988) 4, 8 
General Appliance Corporation vs. Haw, Inc. 
516 P. 2d 346 (Supreme Court of Utah 1973). . 4 
Holbrook Co. vs. Adams 542 P. 2d 191 (Utah 
1975) 10 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt vs. Blomquist 773 P. 
2d 1382 (Utah 1989) 10 
Union Bank vs. Doran 61 Cal. Rpt. 893 (Cal. Court 
of Appeals Second District 1967) 3 
Valley Bank and Trust Company vs. Rite Way 
Concrete Forming 742 P. 2d 105 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1987) . 6 
Westinghouse Credit vs. Hydroswift Corporation 
528 P. 2d 1956 (Utah 1974) 7 
b. STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated 57-1-32 
c. RULES 
Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 . . . 1 
d. OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Blacks Law Dictionary Revised Fourth Edition . 10 
LIST OF PARTIES 
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Defendant/Appellant, Bonneville Industries, Inc,. a 
Nevada corporation. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, a Federal Association, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
C. JOHN GIBSON, LEWIS E. YOUNG 
and BONNEVILLE INDUSTRIES, INC., 
a Nevada corporation 
Defendant and Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
American Savings and Loan Association's 
(hereafter referred to as American) and Bonneville 
Industries, Inch's (hereafter referred to as 
Bonneville) motions for Summary Judgement were 
submitted to the District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the 
Code of Judicial Administration and heard without 
argument by the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding; 
contrary to the allegations as outlined in Appellees 
Brief page 2. (R-212-214) 
Bonneville contests the statements made on page 4 
of American's Brief which indicates a willingness to 
sell the October 28, 1983 Note and Trust Deed to 
Bonneville. Bonneville alleges that it attempted to 
acquire the October 28, 1983 Note and Trust Deed but 
American refused to sell said Note because of the 
Supreme Court 
No. 900264 
subsequent revolving Note with C. John Gibson, 
affidavit of Cary Young in opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R-135) and affidavit of 
Lowell v. Summerhays. (R-154 paragraphs 2 and 3) 
Bonneville contests the statements by American, in 
its brief, which state the revolving Note with John C. 
Gibson was primarily secured by property other than 
property secured under the October 28, 1983 Loan. 
(Affidavit of Lewis E. Young R-182 and 183 and the UCC-
1 dated November 1, 1983 R-191 and 192) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Bonneville alleges that issues of fact exist which 
preclude the granting of American's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to liability. Specifically the attempt to 
purchase the Trust Deed Note of October 28, 1983; which 
was denied because of the subsequent revolving Note. 
This allowed American to receive in excess of 
$3,000,000 in payments utilizing the same property to 
secure the subsequent Note with C. John Gibson. 
Bonneville alleges that based upon the Guaranty in 
question, as drafted by American, Bonneville was to be 
treated as the principal and no separate obligation was 
created. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AMERICAN'S CAUSE OF ACTION AS TO BONNEVILLE IS A 
DEFICIENCY ACTION BASED UPON THE GUARANTY DRAFTED BY 
AMERICAN. 
American incorrectly characterizes it's cause of 
action as to Bonneville as an action based upon an 
absolute guaranty and ignores the plain language of the 
guaranty as drafted by American. The guaranty as 
drafted by American states that the guarantor is the 
principal and primary obligor. The Guaranty therefore 
cannot be enforced as an obligation separate and 
distinct from the underlying transaction. There 
appears to be no dispute that one cannot guaranty ones 
own debt. Union Bank v. Doran 61 Cal. Rpt. 893 (Cal. 
Court of Appeals Second District 1967) The Guaranty 
agreement drafted by American clearly evidences the 
same was being tendered for a Mortgage Loan and under 
paragraph 2 states: 
"...it being the intention hereof that 
Guarantor shall remain liable as principal 
until the full amount of the principal of the 
Note, Deed of Trust and any other document or 
instrument securing the Note, with interest 
and any other sums due or to become due 
thereon, shall have been fully paid..." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The guaranty drafted by American on paragraph 11 
acknowledges that the obligations created under said 
Guaranty are "primary". It is evident from the 
Guaranty as drafted by American that the guarantor is 
to be treated as the principal and primary obligor 
without creating any separate or underlying obligation. 
This clearly appears to be the case as evidence by the 
language of the Guaranty which acknowledges the 
Mortgage Loan to Gibson Cryogenics Inc. and C. John 
Gibson. 
The courts have unanimously held that any 
uncertainty or ambiguity as to the meaning of the terms 
of a guaranty contract should be construed strictly 
against the framer. General Appliance Corporation vs. 
Haw, Inc. 516 P. 2d 346 (Supreme Court of Utah 1973) 
Carrier Brokers, Inc. vs. Spanish Trail 751 P. 2d 258 
(Court of Appeals for Utah 1988) Any ambiguities or 
conflict in the Guaranty should be construed strictly 
against American. The Guaranty in question clearly 
indicates it is the intention of the parties to treat 
the guarantor as the principal until the full amount 
has been paid. Americans actions, based upon the 
foreclosure of the Trust Deed should prevent any 
recovery against Bonneville under Utah Code Annotated 
57-1- 32 as amended. 
The cases quoted by American in their first 
argument basically hold that specific rights can be 
waived in a Guaranty agreement providing there are 
specific references to the rights being waived. 
American then quotes paragraph 4 of the Guaranty to 
hold that they are not required to prosecute or 
institute proceedings for any deficiency as a condition 
of payment. However this argument ignores the action 
taken by American in proceeding with the Trust Deed 
Foreclosure. The language of paragraph 4 of the 
agreement states that the guaranty "may" be enforced by 
the beneficiary without first resorting to or 
exhausting any other security. However in the action 
presently before the court American took affirmative 
action in proceeding with a foreclosure action on the 
Trust Deed. 
The Guaranty does not specifically waive any 
statute of limitations under the anti-deficiency 
statute as adopted in the State of Utah. This based 
upon the requirement that the guaranty be interpreted 
in a light most favorable to the guarantor requires a 
finding that the guaranty agreement treat the guarantor 
as the principal and is therefore entitled to the 
protection of the anti-deficiency statutes as adopted 
in the State of Utah. 
POINT II 
AN ABSOLUTE GUARANTY REQUIRES COMMERCIAL 
REASONABLENESS IN THE DISPOSITION OF SECURED PROPERTY. 
American mistakenly believes that in the event the 
court finds that there is an unconditional or absolute 
guaranty that they are not required to utilize 
commercially reasonableness in the disposition of the 
secured property. The Utah Courts seem to establish a 
fiduciary relationship between the beneficiary and the 
guarantor in, Valley Bank and Trust Company vs. Rite 
Way Concrete Forming 742 P. 2d 105 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1987) which provides that a guarantor has a 
right of subrogation, even in an absolute Guaranty, and 
since subrogation is a "creature of equity" for the 
prevention of injustice and equity compels the ultimate 
payment of a debt by the party who in good conscience 
and justice ought to pay the obligation. The court at 
page 108 in defining this duty states: 
11
 The creditor may liquidate the security and 
apply the proceeds to the obligation, or he 
may forego recourse to the security and 
proceed against the guarantor of payment, 
provided he does not subvert the guarantor's 
subrogation rights against collateral pledged 
by the principal obligor. If he breeches 
that trust duty by destroying, losing, or 
other wise improvidently dissipating the 
collateral, he may not hold the guarantor 
wholly liable because the guarantor would 
have been subrogated to the creditors right 
of resort to that security." 
American has clearly released C. John Gibson from 
any deficiency judgment as a result of its failure to 
proceed with the deficiency action in a timely manner. 
Also Bonneville attempted to acquire the Trust Deed 
Note and Trust Deed from American (R-135 paragraph 6 R-
154 paragraphs 2 and 3). However, because of the 
subsequent agreement between C. John Gibson and 
American regarding a $500,000 revolving Note, in which 
American received over $3,000,000 in payments, American 
would not allow the guarantor to purchase the principal 
Note and protect Bonneville's interest. American's 
actions destroyed Bonneville's right to minimize it's 
damages and ultimately have the party that was morally 
and legally obligating be responsible for the 
obligation. 
If American violated a legal duty owed to the 
guarantor, intentionally or by negligence, said 
violation would abolish the guarantors liability. 
Westinghouse Credit vs. Hydroswift Corporation 528 P. 
2d 1956 (Utah 1974). Bonneville was advised in the 
event of a default on the Principal Loan collections 
would proceed in the order as outlined in the loan 
commitment agreement dated October 3, 1983. The Loan 
Commitment was the basis for Bonneville's execution of 
the Guaranty agreement (R-134, R-75-76). American also 
breached the Loan Commitment agreement under paragraph 
9 (R-141) which provides that the borrower shall not 
permit any other liens to exist on the real property or 
improvements thereon except for the Lenders Deed of 
Trust. American by entering into a revolving loan 
agreement and utilizing the same real and personal 
property as security for the subsequent loan contrary 
to the prohibition against allowing other liens to 
exist upon the real and personal property secured by 
the October 28, 1983 Trustee Note breached the duty 
owed to Bonneville. 
POINT III 
THE SUBSEQUENT REVOLVING LOAN TO C. JOHN GIBSON 
RESULTED IN A MATERIAL MODIFICATION AND A SUBSTANTIAL 
INCREASE OF RISK TO BONNEVILLE 
If a material modification occurs which 
increases the risk upon the guarantors, the guarantors 
are released from any obligation. Carrier Broker vs. 
Spanish Trail 751 P. 2d 258 (Utah Court of Appeals 
1988). The court in the Spanish Trail case at page 261 
stated : 
"Dealings between the debtor and the primary 
obligor which materially modify the terms of 
the guarantors undertaking generally result 
in the discharge of the guarantors 
obligation. 
American by entering into the revolving Note with 
the principal obligor C. John Gibson after execution of 
the Guaranty of October 28, 1983, without the consent 
or knowledge of Bonneville (R-76) and utilizing the 
same property as security for said loan, with American 
receiving in excess of $3,000,000 in payments with no 
payments applied against the initial loan agreement, 
resulted in a material modification of the grantors 
undertaking and a substantial increase of the 
guarantors risks. Bonneville in an attempt to resolve 
the primary obligor's deficiency attempted to pay the 
outstanding balance and acquire the Promissory Note and 
Deed of Trust dated October 28, 1983. (R-135 paragraph 
6, R-154 paragraphs 2 and 3) However Bonneville was 
advised that they could not purchase the Promissory 
Note and Deed of Trust under date of October 28, 1983; 
which if purchased would have abolished all obligations 
under the guaranty and left American as an unsecured 
creditor for all practical purposes under the second 
revolving Note entered into with C. John Gibson. (R-
183) 
American states that the subsequent revolving Note 
with C. John Gibson was paid primarily from accounts 
receivable and that said accounts receivable were not 
secured by the October 28, 1983 loan. However, the 
security agreement attached to plaintiffs complaint as 
Exhibit B under paragraph 3.01 states: 
"...everything used in connection with the 
production of income from the Trust Estate 
and/or adapted for use therein..." (R-23) 
is considered secured property under the security 
agreement. The UCC-1 dated November 1, 1983 and filed 
in connection with the October 28, 1983 Trust Note and 
guaranty agreement provides that secured property 
includes: 
"...the income, rents, issues, profits and 
proceeds from any and all of said 
property,... (R-192 Paragraph A) 
all personal property of every kind and 
description owned by debtor now or any time 
hereafter located or appurtenant to said 
property ... (R-192 Paragraph D) 
Insofar as permitted by applicable, law ... 
contracts..." (R-192 Paragraph E) 
American indicates that the majority of the 
payments they received were from accounts receivable, 
but has never provided a break down of the other 
amounts received or from where said payments were 
received. Blacks Law Dictionary Revised Fourth Edition 
accounts receivable are defined as "Contract 
obligations owing to a person on open account." The 
security agreement by covering contracts and when 
viewed with the all encompassing language, which must 
be interpreted in a light favorable to Bonneville, 
covers all types of personal property including 
accounts receivable. 
POINT IV 
MATERIAL FACTS EXIST WHICH PREVENT THE GRANTING OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR AMERICAN 
The facts and inferences are to be drawn in a 
light most favorable to the losing party Ron Case 
Roofing and Asphalt vs. Blomquist 773 P. 2d 1382 (Utah 
1989). It only takes one contested statement to create 
a controversy or fact to preclude Summary Judgment 
Holbrook Co. vs. Adams 542 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1975). In 
the action presently before the court there are several 
issues of fact which prevent the granting of Summary 
Judgment on behalf of American. 
American indicates they were willing to negotiate 
a sale of the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed dated 
October 28, 1983. However, the affidavit of Cary Young 
and Lowell V. Summerhays indicate that Bonneville 
Industries Inc. attempted to purchase said Trust Deed 
Note and Trust Deed but were advised by agents of 
American that said Trust Deed Note could not be sold as 
a result of subsequent agreements with C. John Gibson. 
(R-135 Paragraph 6, R-154 Paragraphs 2 and 3) In 
retrospect it would appear that if American allowed 
Bonneville to purchase the October 28, 1983 Note it 
would leave American in an unsecured position under the 
subsequent Note. 
Another issue of fact exists regarding the 
substantial increase of risk placed upon the guarantor 
as a result of the subsequent Note utilizing the same 
security by American. American received in excess of 
$3,000,000 in payments on a $500,000 revolving Note, 
utilizing the same property as security in the 
subsequent Note as was used in the October 28, 1983 
loan which should result in denial of American's 
Summary Judgment. An issue of fact also exists in 
connection with the procedure to be followed in the 
event of default based upon the loan commitment of 
October 3, 1983 (R-134, R-75-76) and in allowing a 
security agreement to exist on the same property when 
prohibited by the loan commitment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above Bonneville alleges 
its motion for Summary Judgment should be granted based 
upon the Guaranty which treats Bonneville as the 
principal. American's motion for Summary Judgment 
should be denied based upon the four corners of the 
guaranty agreement and the issues of fact which have 
been raised. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of May 1991 
GERALD M. CONDER 
Attorney for Bonneville 
Industries, Inc. 
Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following this 20th day of May, 1991: 
Ted Boyer 
Anneli R. Smith 
Clyde, Pratt & Snow 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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All of t.ne f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y , waevaer aow owned or h e r e a f t e r a c q u i r e r 
by Deocor: 
(A) The income, rents , i s sues , profits and proceeds froa any and a l l of said 
property, suoject, however, to tne right, power and authority hereinafter given to 
and conferred upon Deotor and/or Secured Party to coiiect and appiy such income, 
rents, issues, profits and proceeds. 
(B) All of the e s t a t e , interest or other claia or demand, which Debtor now has 
or say hereafter acquire, in and to said property, including without l imitat ion a l l 
deposits oade with or other security given to u t i l i t y companies by Debtor wits re-
spect to said property and the improvements thereon, and al l advance payments of in-
surance premiums aaoe by Deotor with respect taereto and claims or demands relat ing 
to insurance. 
(C) All fixtures owned by Debtor now or hereafter affixed to said property, 
including al l buildings, structures and improvements owned by Debtor of every kind 
and description now or hereafter erected or placed thereon and any and a l l machinery, 
boi lers , equipment, p a r t i t i o n s , appliances and other property of every kind and de-
scription now or hereafter placed, attached, affixed or instal led in such bui ldings , 
structures or improvements, and a l l replacements, repairs, addit ions , accessions or 
substitutions or proceeds thereto or therefor, including without l imi ta t ion a l l 
equipment for the generation or distr ibution of air , water, heat, e l e c t r i c i t y , l i g n t . 
fuel or refrigeration, or for vent i la t ing or air conditioning purposes, or for sani -
tary or drainage purposes, or for the removal of dust, refuse or garbage, and in-
cluding ranges, re fr igerators , freezers , cabinets, laundry equipment, radios, t e l e -
v is ions , awnings, window shades. Venetian blinds, drapes and drapery rods and brackets 
screens, carpeting and other floor coverings, lobby furnishings, games and recreations 
equipment and incinerators; a i l of such fixtures woether now or hereafter placed 
thereon, being hereby declared to be real property and referred to hereinafter as the 
"Improvements". 
(D) All personal property of e"very kind and description owned by Debtor now 
or at any time hereafter located or appurtenant to such property and used in connec-
tion with the management or operation of such property (the "Personal Property"), 
including without l i m i t a t i o n , carpeting, drapes, refrigerators, a l l recreational 
equipment and swimming pool equipment. 
(£) Insofar as permitted by applicable law, any licenses ( including but not 
limited to any operating l i c e n s e s or similar matters), contracts, management con-
tracts or agreements, franchise agreements, permits, authorities or c e r t i f i c a t e s 
required or used in connection with the ownership of, or the operation or maintenance 
of, the Improvements or Personal Property (hereinafter c o l l e c t i v e l y ca l led the 
"Licenses"). All of the property hereby conveyed, or intended to be conveyed, to 
Trustee is referred to herein as the "Property". 
(?) Debtor hereby ass igns and transfers to Secured Party, as additional 
security, a l l damages, r o y a l t i e s and revenue of every kind, nature and description 
whatsoever that Debtor may be ent i t l ed to receive froa any person or en t i ty owning 
or having or hereafter acquiring a right to the o i l , gas or mineral r ights and re-
servations of the Property, with the right in Secured Party to receive and receipt 
therefor and apply the same to the indebtedness secured hereby e i ther before or after 
any default hereunder, and Secured Party may demand, sue for and recover any such 
payment* but s h a l l not b e r e q u i r e d so to do . 
The f i l ing of th i s financing statement shall not be construed to derogate from 
or impair the l ien or provis ions of the Deed of Trast from Debtor to Secured Party 
encumoermg that real property with respect to any property described therein wtucn 
is real property or which the parties have agreed to treat is real property. The 
hereoy stated intention of the Debtor and Secured Party is that everything used in 
connection with tne production of income froa that real property or adapted for use 
therein i s , and at a i l times and for a l l purposes and in a l l proceedings beta legal 
or equitable, shall be regarded zs real property and part of the real property encum-
bered by sucn Deed of Trust, irrespect ive of whether or not the same is pnysicaiiy 
attached to the Improvements thereon. Similarly, nothing in this financing s ta te -
ment shall be construed to a l t er any of tne ngnts of Secured Party as determined 
by the Dtcii of Trust or the pr ior i ty of the Secured Party's l ien created thereoy, 
and this financing statement i s declared to be for the protection of Securec Party 
in the event any court s h a l l at any time hold that notice of Secured Party s pr ior i ty 
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